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Total Factor Productivity and Economic Freedom 
Implications for EU Enlargement 
 
  The ongoing enlargement of the European Union (EU), expanding from the initial 6 to 15 and 
now to 25 members with more in the wings, is at the frontier of economic and political 
integration. Political and economic stumbling blocks have been hurdled, but the larger number of 
countries and greater economic and political disparities make the process more and more 
difficult. In this chapter, we consider the existing disparities in economic freedom among the 25 
EU countries and the evolution of total factor productivity (TFP) in the manufacturing sectors of 
a selected group of OECD countries, some of which were members of the EU during the period 
studied. We are interested both in TFP convergence and in the relationships between TFP and 
economic freedom. 
We first use the methodology of Bernard and Jones (1996) to test for TFP convergence in 
the manufacturing sector and in nine disaggregated manufacturing industries in 12 OECD 
countries.  TFP convergence at the aggregate level, at least, among countries in the EU is 
important for the EU’s goals related to political and social cohesion. Convergence is necessary 
for cohesion because it implies that all countries in the union can have strong economies, while 
outcome diversity diminishes. Although neoclassical economics suggests that convergence is to 
be expected, increasing returns, in its new economic geography clothes or in its older versions, 
among other phenomena may yield divergence. 
In a recent paper, Freeman (2002) evaluates and uses the Fraser Institute’s economic 
freedom index (Gwartney et al. 2003) to test for differences in economic performance among 
OECD countries that may result from institutional differences. He concludes that the index is 
correlated reasonably well in the expected direction with other measures of economic freedom 
and with more specific measures of labor market flexibility, product market regulation, and 
barriers to entrepreneurial activity. Thus, the index provides a summary measure of institutional 
considerations associated with economic freedom. It is particularly valuable for his purposes 
(and ours) because it is available, starting with 1970, in five-year increments, thus permitting 
construction of a cross-section, time-series panel. Freeman uses panel estimators, controlling for 
time and country fixed effects, to estimate the association between economic freedom and 
economic performance.  He and others find such an association, without and  with time and   3
country effects, if the countries sampled have large variations in economic performance and 
economic freedom.  If the country observations  consist only of OECD countries, however, 
Freeman concludes that variation in the Fraser index of economic freedom is not associated with 
variations in economic performance. He suggests that this result occurs because OECD countries 
have reached a threshold of basic market freedoms necessary for advanced capitalism. Once 
reached, he concludes, countries can have a variety of economic institutions that cause 
differences in the freedom index without associated differences in performance.  
The current enlargement of the EU, however, includes countries that are moving toward 
but may not have reached this threshold of basic market freedoms. If the EU is going to become 
a single market, these countries can be expected to change their institutions in ways that increase 
their economic freedom indices. What will be the effect, if any, of these institutional changes on 
the level and evolution of TFP? We believe that we can provide information pertinent to this 
question by examining countries that have traveled a similar path. Unlike Freeman, we find that 
variation in economic freedom among a selection of OECD countries is positively associated 
with variation in economic performance.  
To pursue these arguments, it is first necessary to examine the Fraser index for OECD 
countries, current EU countries, and the accession countries. We will then describe our data and 
its construction, followed by a test of TFP convergence. Finally, we will bring the Institute’s 
freedom index into the analysis of TFP.  
 
Economic Freedom, the EU, and the OECD 
 
According to its developers, the Fraser index (Gwartney et al., 2003) is derived assuming 
that “the key ingredients of economic freedom are personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom 
to compete, and protection of person and property.” In addition to what Freeman (2002) calls “a 
strong tradition of basic market freedoms—protection of property, rule of law, private ownership 
rights, viability of contracts, etc.—“ the Fraser index emphasizes personal choice and voluntary 
exchange.  It considers size of government, freedom to compete, and access to a stable currency 
of the same level of importance as property rights, individual markets, or international openness 
in measuring economic freedom. It presumes that a large government sector, for instance, is 
associated with less economic freedom because it implies collective, rather than individual,   4
choice rules over a larger sector of the economy. This is one the distinctive differences between 
the “Anglo-American” economic system and the “Social-Market” system of Continental Europe.   
Table 1 gives the Fraser index for each of the 12 OECD countries in our data set and for other 
relevant groups of countries. As seen in Panel A, beginning in 1975 the average index for the 12 
countries increased steadily until 2001. The increase in the index from 1980 to 1990, however, is 
substantially greater than the increase from 1990 to 2000. Examining the individual countries, 
we see the remarkable convergence and steady country by country increase in the index noted by 
Freeman. Comparing the Anglo countries in Panel B (Canada, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States) with the Social-Market countries in Panel C that were in the original European 
trade associations  (Belgium, France, Italy, and the Netherlands), we see that both sets  of 
countries experienced increases in economic freedom, beginning in 1975. The Anglo countries, 
however, had greater average economic freedom in 1975 (6.5 compared to 5.9) and 2001 (8.2 
compared to 7.2). Although it is risky to talk about a trend with so few observations, the data 
hints that both groups of countries have reached a local peak in their indices, with the Anglo 
countries experiencing greater economic freedom than the Social-Market countries. 
The average value for the first nine countries in the EU is also shown in Table 1, Panel D. 
From 1980 to 1995 it increased from 6.2 to 7.3 with little apparent change from 1995 to 2000 or 
2001. Since the early 1970s, six countries have joined the EU. Although we do not know the 
extent to which their prospective membership in the EU influenced their institutional change, the 
average index for these countries, as seen in Panel E, increased steadily from 5.3 in 1975 to 7.3 
in 2000. The similarity between the average for these earlier accession countries and the current 
accession countries (the 10 approved countries plus Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey) in Panel F 
lagged 20 years is remarkable. The average for the latter countries in 1995 was 5.3 and it had 
risen to 6.1 by 2000. Twenty years earlier, the average for the original six was 5.3 and it had 
risen to 5.9 by 1980. These trends may suggest that these new accession countries will continue 
institutional change that results in larger measured economic freedom, just as happened for the 
earlier accession group. 
 
Table 1: Economic Freedom Indices for Selected Countries 
Title and footnote for the table on the next page. 
Source: The Fraser Institute indices were taken from Gwartney et al. (2003)   5
  Scores                                   
Countries  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2001    Countries  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2001   
Panel A                    Panel D                   
Countries Considered                    EU-9                   
Austria  6.1  5.8  6.2  6.3  6.9  7  7.4  7.5    Belgium  7.3  6.6  6.9  6.9  7.3  7.2  7.4  7.4   
Belgium  7.3  6.6  6.9  6.9  7.3  7.2  7.4  7.4    Denmark  6.6  5.9  6.1  6.2  7  7.4  7.6  7.6   
Canada  7.4  6.6  7  7.1  7.7  7.8  8.1  8    France  6.2  5.5  5.7  5.8  6.9  6.8  7  6.7   
Finland  6.7  5.8  6.4  6.6  7.1  7.3  7.6  7.7    Germany  7.3  6.8  7.1  7.2  7.5  7.5  7.6  7.3   
France  6.2  5.5  5.7  5.8  6.9  6.8  7  6.7    Ireland  6.5  5.8  6.2  6.2  7.1  8.2  8.1  8   
United Kingdom  5.9  5.7  6.1  6.9  7.7  8.1  8.3  8.3    Italy  5.8  5.1  5.2  5.5  6.4  6.5  7.1  7   
Italy  5.8  5.1  5.2  5.5  6.4  6.5  7.1  7    Luxembourg  7  7  6.8  7.2  7.5  7.5  7.7  7.6   
South Korea  5.1  5.1  5.4  5.5  6  6.5  7  7.1    Netherlands  7.1  6.4  6.9  7.1  7.5  7.8  8  7.8   
Netherlands  7.1  6.4  6.9  7.1  7.5  7.8  8  7.8    United Kingdom  5.9  5.7  6.1  6.9  7.7  8.1  8.3  8.3   
Norway  5.9  5.4  5.7  6.2  6.9  7.4  7.2  7.1    Average  6.6  6  6.2  6.4  7.1  7.3  7.5  7.4   
Sweden  5.6  5.2  5.6  6.2  6.7  7.2  7.4  7.2    Panel E                   
United States  7  7.1  7.4  7.5  8.2  8.3  8.5  8.3    Earlier Accession                   
Average  6.3  5.9  6.2  6.5  7.1  7.3  7.6  7.6    Austria  6.1  5.8  6.2  6.3  6.9  7  7.4  7.5   
Panel B                    Finland  6.7  5.8  6.4  6.6  7.1  7.3  7.6  7.7   
Anglo-American                    Greece  6.2  5.7  5.5  5.2  5.8  6.3  6.8  6.7   
Canada  7.4  6.6  7  7.1  7.7  7.8  8.1  8    Portugal  6  3.8  5.6  5.4  6.1  7.3  7.3  7.2   
United Kingdom  5.9  5.7  6.1  6.9  7.7  8.1  8.3  8.3    Spain  6.2  5.5  5.7  5.9  6.3  7  7.3  7   
United States  7  7.1  7.4  7.5  8.2  8.3  8.5  8.3    Sweden  5.6  5.2  5.6  6.2  6.7  7.2  7.4  7.2   
Average  6.8  6.5  6.8  7.2  7.8  8.1  8.3  8.2    Average  6.1  5.3  5.9  5.9  6.5  7  7.3  7.2   
Panel C                    Panel F                 
Social-Market                    Current Accession                    
Belgium  7.3  6.6  6.9  6.9  7.3  7.2  7.4  7.4    Bulgaria           4.5  3.5  4.2  5.3  5.2   
France  6.2  5.5  5.7  5.8  6.9  6.8  7  6.7    Cyprus     5.4  5.3  5.3  5.9  6.1  6.1  6.3   
Italy  5.8  5.1  5.2  5.5  6.4  6.5  7.1  7    Czech Rep.                 5.8  6.8  6.8   
Netherlands  7.1  6.4  6.9  7.1  7.5  7.8  8  7.8    Estonia                 5.4  6.9  7.4   
Average  6.6  5.9  6.2  6.3  7  7.1  7.4  7.2    Hungary        4.2  5  4.9  6.3  6.6  6.9   
                    Latvia                 4.6  6.5  6.6   
                    Lithuania                 4.7  6.2  6.2   
                    Malta        5.1  4.9  5.3  6.6  6.4  6.4   
                    Poland           3.8  3.6  5.3  5.8  6   
                    Romania           4.7  4.2  3.7  4.6  4.6   
                    Slovak Rep                 5.3  6.1  6   
                    Slovenia                 4.7  5.9  5.9   
                    Turkey  3.5  3.8  3.5  4.7  4.8  5.7  5.8  5.3   
                    Average            5.3  6.1  6.1   
                                         6
TFP Convergence in Manufacturing in Selected Countries: 1980 to 1998 
 
Productivity comparisons across countries and over time are difficult for many of the 
same reasons that comparisons of productivity level and growth are difficult within a country. To 
calculate productivity and productivity growth for industries or industry-regions within a country 
at a disaggregated level for, say, the manufacturing sector or a branch of the manufacturing 
sector such as transportation equipment, it is necessary  to deflate the value of output in the 
industry by an appropriate price index. To be appropriate, the index must somehow incorporate 
quality improvements so that it is an index for a product of constant quality.  In addition to 
accounting for changes in the quality of the product over time, the product mix ideally would 
also be controlled. It is also necessary to measure input use on the basis of constant input quality. 
Ideally, the output measure would be gross output and the inputs would consist of various types 
of capital, labor, and materials. 
  Changing the research question to comparisons of TFP levels and growth across countries 
introduces two new fundamental problems. The first is an index number problem that arises 
because of the cross-country dimension. Pairwise comparisons of a bilateral productivity index 
are not transitive. This makes the productivity comparisons sensitive to the base country chosen 
in the comparison. Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982a and 1982b) tackle this problem by 
developing a multilateral productivity index that is not sensitive to the choice of base country or 
base year.  
  The other fundamental problem that arises in cross-country comparisons arises because 
different national currencies must be converted to a common currency. Market exchange rates 
are not appropriate because they typically are influenced by short-term capital movements. 
Furthermore, there could be huge variations in price ratios even in traded sectors across countries 
due to different economic conditions, such as degree of monopoly power in a specific industry or 
a time lag in response to exchange rate movements. A solution is to use purchasing power parity 
(PPP) exchange rates to bring all values to a common currency. 
  The relative prices of products vary across countries because of different opportunity 
costs of inputs and because the products themselves are not homogenous across countries, 
making aggregate PPPs deficient in disaggregated comparison. Otherwise similar products may 
be of different quality across countries and the mix of products within a certain industry may 
differ across countries. O’Mahony (1996) and van Ark (1996) discuss these issues in detail.   7
Harrigan (1997) chose to use expenditure category PPPs to convert domestic currencies into a 
common currency.  A shortcoming of this is that it does not take account of intermediate 
products, which are important part of manufacturing output. The unit value ratio (UVR), which 
is based on industry of origin rather than final expenditure category, is the conversion factor 
preferred by van Ark. Unit value ratios (UVRs), however, are not available in secondary data 
sources,  whereas  PPPs by expenditure category are so available. Therefore,  the pragmatic 
solution for input and output conversion is to use PPPs by expenditure category. Our primary 
data is from the new OECD STAN  (Structural Analysis)  Database.  This database has been 
revised using new industrial classifications. To use this new database we had to limit the number 
of countries and industries in the analysis. Our data are for 12 countries—Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Finland, France, Great Britain, Italy, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the 
United States.  Fortunately, this list of countries gives a sampling of OECD countries well 
tailored to our focus. It includes early members of the European Union and members that have 
joined in the 1990s; in addition it includes four countries that are not in the EU.   
  The industry list is also diverse. It includes the manufacturing sector and seven two-digit 
branches and one three-digit branch, namely—Food Products; Textiles; Wood Products; Pulp, 
Paper Products and Printing; Chemical Products; Non-Metallic Mineral Products; Basic Metals; 
Machinery and Equipment; and Transportation Equipment. 
We have followed Harrigan’s (1997) procedures o adjust the data.  For instance, the labor 
input is adjusted to an hours worked measure for all countries. Wage rates for broad occupational 
categories in the United States are used to adjust the labor hours for labor quality. Our data 
provide fixed capital formation by industry instead of  capital stock.  We use Harrigan’s 
parameters in the perpetual inventory approach to converting fixed capital formation flows to 
capital stock.
1 
Studies by Bernard and Jones (1996) and by Harrigan (1997) concentrate on cross-country 
comparisons of productivity in sectors of the aggregate economy. Bernard and Jones estimate 
convergence in broad sectors of the aggregate economy, e.g. agriculture, mining, and 
manufacturing, using cross-section data. Although they found evidence of convergence for other 
sectors of the economy, they did not find evidence of convergence in manufacturing. Harrigan’s 
study of 2-digit ISIC manufacturing industries did not test for convergence; he showed, however, 
                                                 
1 See Yang (2003) for the precise calculation methods used to calculate the multilateral total factor productivity 
indices used in this paper.  We followed Harrigan’s (1997) procedures as closely as we could. 
   8
that TFP for manufacturing industries differs across OECD countries. In a recent study, Nicoletti 
and Scarpetta (2003) analyze total factor productivity using annual data for 23 manufacturing 
and service industries over the period 1984-98. They estimate convergence coefficients for the 
manufacturing sector and the service sector. In their baseline estimation using this panel data, the 
convergence coefficient for the service sector is much larger than the one for the manufacturing 
sector, but both sectors exhibit convergence. 
There are two distinct definitions of convergence:b -convergence and s -convergence (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). Productivity convergence across countries can be analysed based on 
two questions: (1) Do countries with relatively high initial levels of TFP grow relatively slowly 
(b -convergence)? and (2) Is there a reduction over time in the cross-sectional variance of TFP 
(s -convergence)? If the idea of a common technology for an industry across countries—at least 
in the long run— were to have validity, both types of convergence would seem to be necessary. 
b -Convergence 
To examine b -convergence, assume that productivity (TFP) for a manufacturing branch in 
countryi, t i A, , is:   
t i t i t i i t i A G A , 1 , , , ln ln ln ln e l g + + + = -              (1) 
where, l  is the catch-up parameter, t i G ,  is the technology gap, and  t i, e  is a manufacturing branch 
and country specific error term. The technology gap,  t i G , is the negative of the previous period’s 
productivity in countryirelative to that in base country b , the country with the highest TFP: 









, ˆ = .   t i A, ˆ  is the technology gap and can be expressed as a function of its past 
values (see Barnard and Jones, 1996):   
t i t i b i t i A A , 1 , , ˆ ln ˆ ln ) 1 ( ) ( ˆ ln e l g g + - + - = -             (2) 
This says that the technology gap between country i and the base country b is a function of the 
lagged gap ( ) ˆ ln 1 , - t i A in the same productivity measure. If both countries have the same 
asymptotic rate of TFP growth and if the catch-up parameter l is between zero and one, then 
productivity differentials result in a higher growth rate for the country with lower productivity.   
Following Bernard and Jones (1996), the estimating equation is:    9
i i i TFPGap TFP e b a + + = D ) ln( ) ln(
1980             (3) 
where  ) ln( i TFP D is the growth rate of TFP of country i over 1980-1998, which can be expressed 
as  ) ln )(ln / 1 ( ) / ln(
1980 1998 / 1 1980 1998
i i
T
i i TFP TFP T TFP TFP - = . The technology gap ( i TFPGap ) is the 
ratio of country i’s TFP to the maximum level of TFP in the initial period. The speed of 
convergence, l , is calculated from  
.





- =                   (4) 
A regression of the long run average growth rate on the initial technology gap tests 
convergence, with a negative coefficient on the initial gap required for convergence. The 
intuition for this is straightforward. As the productivity in a low-productivity country increases 
relative to that of the leader country, the catch-up opportunities available to the low-productivity 
country decrease.   
Table 2 presents the results for b -Convergence for TFP. For each manufacturing branch, the 
growth rate of TFP is regressed on its initial level of the TFPGap with a constant, producing an 
estimate of b . The implied convergence speed, l , is calculated using equation  (4). The 
convergence speed is the rate at which TFP level is converging to the productivity leader’s TFP, 
which may itself be growing over time. As shown in Table 2, all branches of manufacturing and 
the manufacturing sector exhibit convergence. The estimated negative coefficient of the initial 
technology gap is significant using a one-tail test at the 10 percent level for Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco, at 5 percent for Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Products, and at 1 percent for the 
remaining seven industries and the manufacturing sector. 
The convergence rates for the manufacturing branches vary from 2.37 percent in Chemical, 
Rubber, Plastics and Fuel Products to 6.98 percent in Pulp, Paper and Printing & Publishing. Just 
as there is substantial variation in the convergence rates, the 
2 R s for the convergence regressions 
vary substantially—from 0.27 for Food, Beverages and Tobacco to 0.90 for Machinery and 
Equipment. Unlike Bernard and Jones (1996), we find convergence in the manufacturing sector 
with a 3 percent speed of convergence. They find that some evidence for labor-productivity 
convergence, but not TFP convergence. Their speeds of adjustment for sectors of the economy 
range from 1.3 to 6.5 percent per year; our adjustment speeds for manufacturing branches range 
from 1.6 (Food) to 5 percent (Machinery and Equipment).   10
Table 2: TFP Convergence Regressions by Industry 
      b      t    l  
2 R    
    Manufacturing Sector                                -0.02370
!  -2.42  0.0304  0.42    
    Food, Beverages and Tobacco                      -0.01427
*  -1.73  0.0164  0.27    
    Textiles, Leather and Footwear Products           -0.01968
!  -5.61  0.0240  0.80 
    Wood and Products of Wood and Cork  -0.03199
!  -3.22  0.0465  0.56      
    Pulp, Paper and Printing & Publishing             -0.04044
!  -2.92  0.0698  0.52    
    Chemical, Rubber, Plastics and Fuel Products  -0.01950
!  -2.90  0.0237  0.51      
    Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products               -0.02303
!  -4.49  0.0293  0.72      
    Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Products  -0.02094
#  -2.17  0.0259  0.37      
    Machinery and Equipment                           -0.03355
!  -8.72  0.0501  0.90      
    Transport Equipment                               -0.03073
!  -5.04  0.0438  0.76  
Notes: 1) This regression is based on TFP indices of 12 OECD countries (11 for wood products) by industry. With 
10 degrees of freedom (9 for Wood Products), the critical values for t for a one-tailed test at 0.1, 0.5, and 0.01 are 




One way to examine the data fors -convergence is to study the time trend of the standard 
deviation of the productivity indices. A declining standard deviation indicates that the TFPs for 
various countries are getting closer. Figure 1 presents the cross–sectional standard deviations of 
log TFP over time for manufacturing. The manufacturing sector exhibits a reduction in this 
standard deviation over time. It falls in the early 1980s, is flat until about 1990, when it again 
resumes its fall. In all the manufacturing branches, the standard deviations are lower at the end 
than at the beginning of the period.  
Several patterns exist, however, within this generalization. Chemicals and Pulp and Paper 
both have extended periods (about a decade) of a rising standard deviation, and the pattern for 
Textiles is uneven. The remaining industries have declining trends with some interruption. The 
pattern appears consistent with the idea that  s -convergence is relatively strong, but is 
interrupted by country-industry specific shocks.   11
Figure 1 Standard Deviation of (Log) TFP by Manufacturing Branch 
ISIC 31: Food, Beverages and 
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Figure 1 ( ~ ) Standard Deviation of (Log) TFP by Manufacturing Branch  
 



























  The existence of relatively strong evidence of b- and s-convergence supports the idea of 
technology transfers between and among countries. Countries with lower levels of productivity 
have faster productivity growth, which may be based on adapting frontier technologies to their 
situation The remainder of this chapter presents some preliminary estimates of the effects of 
economic freedom on relative productivity levels and growth. 
 
Total Factor Productivity Differences and Economic Freedom 
 
  Freeman (2002) regresses levels and growth of various measures of economic performance 
on the economic freedom index, country dummies, and time dummies. As mentioned, he finds 
that economic performance is not associated with economic freedom across a selection of OECD 
countries when dummy variables are included to control country effects and time effects. He 
concludes that different sets of institutions, which for instance result in the different freedom 
rankings for the Anglo-American countries and the Social-Market countries, among advanced 
countries are equally amenable to good economic performance.  
  To examine the question of TFP levels and economic freedom, we regress the TFPGap—the 
technology gap—on the economic freedom index, including dummy variables for countries and 
time.  We have calculated relative TFP levels from 1980 to 1998 for 12 countries and 9 
manufacturing industries (See Yang, 2003), and have observed, as did Harrigan (1997), that 
annual TFP can vary erratically, presumably due to measurement error. Because the freedom 
index is only available in five-year increments, we make a virtue of necessity by averaging the 
TFP relative productivity indexes over the three years centered on 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995.    13
  For each industry, except for ICIS 33 for which data for France are not available, we have 12 
countries and 4 cross sections (See the footnote in Table 3 for the list of industries by ICIS code.) 
This gives 48 observations for each of nine industries and 44 observations for the tenth. Our 
estimating equation for a particular industry is  
  = it TFPGap i t t i i it Time Country EF e b b b a + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + 1        (5) 
Table 3 gives the results of estimating this equation for each industry.  The set of estimates in 
columns 2 and 3 are for the ordinary least squares estimator, which pools all of the data in the 
panel. The coefficient of economic freedom is significant and large for nine of the ten industries. 
To gauge the quantitative impact of the coefficient, note that in 1995, for instance, the economic 
freedom index ranges from 6.5 for Italy and Korea to 8.3 for the United States. The significant 
coefficients for economic freedom range from 0.15 to 0.32. Now conduct a thought experiment 
using plausible values for the relevant parameters. Suppose a country has a freedom index of 7 
and a relative productivity index of 0.6. The coefficient range predicts that an otherwise identical 
country with a freedom index of 8 would have a relative productivity index between 0.75 to 0.92. 
Such a large effect may not be plausible, but these coefficients may be biased because other 
factors correlated with economic freedom are not controlled.     
  To examine the possible effects of omitted variables, we add country dummies to the 
pooled model, obtaining the results given in Columns 4 and 5.  In this set of estimates, 8 of the 
10 industries have significant coefficients for economic freedom, but all of the coefficients are 
much smaller than in column 2, suggesting that omitted variables are a problem in the pooled 
estimate. The significant coefficients range from 0.06 to 0.16. Conducting the same thought 
experiment as above, we find that a freedom index of 8 rather than 7 would be associated with a 
productivity relative in the range of 0.66 to 0.76 rather than 0.60. 
In columns 7 and 8 are the results for the full model with economic freedom and country 
and time dummies. The addition of the time dummies results in the freedom coefficients being 
significant for only two industries, 32 and 384. For these two industries the freedom coefficient 
is essentially the same as in column 5. Thus, just as Freeman finds, models that include country 
and time dummies show little association between freedom and performance. An association 
between economic freedom and performance exists with the models that include    14
Table 3: The Effects of Economic Freedom on the Relative Productivity in the 
Manufacturing Sector and Selected Industries 
 
       1      2       3         4           5         6           7                8         9 
Fixed Effects    None      Country                      Time and Country 
Industry  EF      R
2            EF       R
2     F-Statistic          EF        R
2        F-Statistic 
   
ISIC 3  0.20  0.37    0.07
!  0.94  2.55    0.04  0.96  1.93 
  (5.25)     (3.46)       (1.03)     
 
ISIC31  0.18  0.17    0.06
#  0.93  2.59    0.09  0.93  0.33 
  (3.11)     (2.07)       (1.54)     
 
ISIC32  0.32  0.32    0.08  0.95      0.08
*  0.96  3.44 
  (4.70)     (2.55)       (1.33)     
 
ISIC33  0.38  0.31    0.00  0.94      -0.14  0.96  3.66 
  (4.30)     (-0.03)      (-1.81)     
 
ISIC34  0.15  0.27    0.06
#  0.81  2.09    0.03  0.84  2.29 
  (4.18)     (1.81)       (0.52)     
 
ISIC35  0.01  0.00    0.04  0.62      -0.05  0.64  8.89 
  (0.25)     (0.90)       (-0.78)     
 
ISIC36  0.22  0.30    0.11
!  0.94  2.57    0.06  0.94  1.15 
  (4.40)     (4.12)       (1.11)     
 
ISIC37  0.23  0.30    0.15  0.88          0.07  0.09  9.82 
  (4.44)     (3.98)       (1.22)     
 
ISIC38  0.26  0.32    0.15  0.86      0.04  0.93  9.40 
  (4.64)     (3.36)       (0.69)     
 
ISIC384  0.25  0.25    0.16  0.88      0.15
#  0.91  2.93 
                (3.96)            (3.85)        (1.93)     
Note:       1) Bold type indicates the preferred model. 
       2) The number in parentheses is the t-statistic for the coefficient. 
       3) The coefficients for ISIC 33 were estimated from an 11-country sample (France excluded); 12 countries      
were available for the remaining industries. 
       4)  !, #, and * indicate significance at p=0.01, p=0.05. and p=0.10 with a one-tail test. 
                5) EF is the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom. 
       6)  ISIC coding stands for the following;  
    ISIC 3: Manufacturing Sector 
    ISIC31: Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco 
    ISIC32: Textiles, Textile Products, Leather and Footwear  
    ISIC33: Wood And Products Of Wood and Cork 
    ISIC34: Pulp, Paper, Paper Products, Printing and Publishing 
    ISIC35: Chemical, Rubber, Plastics and Fuel Products 
    ISIC36: Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
    ISIC37: Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Products 
    ISIC38: Machinery and Equipment (Except. 384)  
    ISIC384:Transport Equipment  
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country dummies, but almost disappears with the inclusion of the time dummies. An association 
between economic freedom and performance exists with the models that include country 
dummies, but almost disappears with the inclusion of the time dummies. Given the positive 
trends in the freedom index, it is perhaps not surprising that the inclusion of the time dummies 
reduces the precision of the estimated coefficients. Consequently, the answer to the question of 
an association between freedom and performance depends upon model selection. If either the 
time or country dummies are inappropriate for the model, the efficiency of the estimator is 
reduced.  Although the freedom coefficients would not be biased, their standard errors could be 
overestimated, reducing the coefficients’ t statistics.  Therefore, we test for the preferred model 
by comparing the full model to the model with country dummies and economic freedom; i.e., we 
test for the joint significance of the coefficients of the time dummies. 
The results in columns 7 and 8 are for the unrestricted model. In column 9 we present the 
F-statistic for the hypothesis that the coefficients of the time dummy variables jointly equal zero. 
The calculated F is 1.93 and, with 4 and 30 degrees of freedom, the critical value for p = 0.05 is 
2.69. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the time dummies jointly equal 
zero in the manufacturing sector. Next, we perform the same test for the country dummies for the 
manufacturing sector. The critical value for p =0.05 with 12 and 34 degrees of freedom is 2.05. 
As shown in Column 6, the calculate F is 2.55; we reject that null hypothesis that the coefficients 
of the country dummies jointly equal zero. For the manufacturing sector, the specification with 
the country dummies and the economic freedom index is preferred; the bold type indicates that 
this is the preferred model. For the manufacturing sector as whole, the positive coefficient for 
economic freedom in the preferred model is highly significant (p=. 01), but has a much smaller 
coefficient than in the pooled estimate. Comparing otherwise identical countries, a country with 
a freedom index of 8 rather than 7 is associated with a 0.07 larger productivity relative in the 
manufacturing sector: 0.67 rather than 0.60.  
   In Table 3, we report the results obtained by using this same strategy for all of the industries; 
results for the preferred specification for each industry are in bold type.  For the preferred 
specifications, two of the freedom coefficients are significantly greater than zero at the 0.01 
level, three at the 0.05 level, and one at the 0.10 level. We have evidence, particularly strong for 
the manufacturing sector as a whole, of a positive association between economic freedom and 
total factor productivity. The positive association between economic freedom and time, however, 
makes it difficult to determine just how strong the relationship is.  This correlation between   16
freedom and time also may account for Freeman’s finding of little relationship between 
economic freedom and economic performance; all of his equations, except for the OLS pooled 
model, include time dummies. Productivity growth is just as important as the productivity level, 
so we now the relationship between it and economic freedom. 
 
Total Factor Productivity Growth and Economic Freedom 
   
To continue our analysis of productivity and economic freedom, we turn to testing the 
relationship between economic  freedom and TFP growth. We first specify equation (6), by 
adding the economic freedom index and the country and time fixed effects to equation (3) to 
obtain: 
  = D + ) 1 ( ln t to t i TFP i t t i i it it Time Country EF TFPGap e b b b b a + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + 2 1 ln (6) 
We expect TFP growth to be a function of the technology gap (TFPGap) and economic freedom 
(EF), both measured at the beginning of the period. In this section we again use four cross 
sections (three at five year intervals and one at a three year interval) for estimation. We calculate 
TFP growth by first averaging the productivity levels for the three year period for which 1980, 
1985, 1990, and 1995 are the midpoints. We then annualize the log difference in the levels for 
each period to get the growth rate. We use our results for 1998 to create the fourth cross section, 
by annualizing the log difference between 1998 and 1995.  Table 4 presents three sets of 
estimates, one including the two continuous variables, country dummies, and time dummies, one 
including the continuous variables and country dummies, and one including only the continuous 
variables. 
  Examining Table 4, we again see that the specification that includes time dummies has 
few—three— industries (ISIC 33, ISIC 36 and ISIC 37) with freedom coefficients significantly 
greater than zero. In contrast in the specification with country, but not time, dummies six of the 
freedom coefficients are significant, while in the estimates with no dummies, seven freedom 
coefficients are significant. Again the strong time trend in the freedom variables may make it 
difficult to isolate the effects of economic freedom on economic performance in OECD 
countries. We again test for the preferred model, following the same procedure as before.   
The coefficients of the continuous variables from the unrestricted model are in columns 9 
and 10. The F statistic for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the time dummies jointly 
equal zero is in column 12.  The two industries for which the null cannot be rejected are   17
industries 35 and 384. For the eight remaining industries, the null hypothesis of no country 
effects is rejected in only one, industry 31 (See columns 5 and 6 for the coefficients and column 
7 for the calculated F statistics.) The preferred estimates are again in bold. In six of the preferred 
estimates the coefficient of economic freedom is significantly greater than zero. The significant 
coefficients average 0.02.   
Table 4. The effects of the Technology Gap and Economic Freedom on TFP Growth  
in the Manufacturing Sector and Selected Industries 
 
  1               2           3          4                  5            6        7            8              9                10       11         12   
Fixed Effects              Country                 Time and Country 
 
Industry TGap  EF  R
2  TGap  EF  R
2  F-Stat  TGap  EF  R
2  F-Stat  
ISIC 3  -0.07
!  0.01
#  0.36  -0.07  0.01  0.43  0.38  -0.06  0.00  0.47  0.47 
  (-4.90  (2.33)    (-1.62)  (2.06)      (-1.29)  (0.30)     
                     
ISIC31  -0.02  0.00  0.20  -0.09
!  0.00  0.57  2.16  -0.09  -0.01  0.60  1.10 
  (-2.92)  (-0.25)    (-4.07) (-0.83)      (-3.45)  (-0.91)     
                     
ISIC32  -0.09
!  0.02
#  0.25  -0.11  0.04  0.35  0.36  -0.09  0.03  0.39  0.64 
  (-3.88)  (1.75)    (-1.21)  (1.90)      (-0.89)  (0.76)     
                     
ISIC33  -0.09
!  0.03
#  0.30  0.10  0.04  0.49  0.98  0.14  0.07  0.52  0.71 
             (-4.13)  (1.88)    (1.38)  (2.02)      (1.60)  (1.93)     
                     
ISIC34  -0.08  0.00  0.29  -0.11  0.00  0.50  1.12  -0.10  0.01  0.51  0.29 
  (-3.87)  (0.45)    (-2.98)  (0.64)      (-2.27)  (0.66)     
                     
ISIC35  -0.05  0.00  0.09  -0.10  -0.01  0.29    -0.24  -0.03  0.57  6.20 
  (-2.12)  (-0.20)    (-2.62)  (-1.03)      (0.04)  (-1.62)     
                     
ISIC36  -0.07
!  0.02
!  0.33  -0.21  0.04  0.56  1.48  -0.22  0.03  0.58  0.33 
  (-4.66)  (2.78)    (-4.67)  (4.48)      (-4.59)  (1.94)     
                     
ISIC37  -0.06
!  0.01
#  0.38  -0.14  0.02  0.56  1.10  -0.19  0.02  0.63  1.74 
  (-5.21) (2.21)    (-5.00)  (3.24)      (-4.80)  (1.51)     
                     
ISIC38  -0.07
!  0.02
!  0.26  -0.10  0.05  0.48  1.15  -0.12  0.01  0.56  1.81 
  (-3.97)  (2.67)    (0.00)  (0.00)      (-2.23)  (0.65)     
                     
ISIC384 -0.05  0.02  0.24  -0.09  0.03  0.33    -0.16
!  0.01  0.57  5.24 
  (-3.80)  (2.22)    (-2.39)  (2.33)      (-4.28)  (0.71) 
Note:      1) Bold type indicates the preferred model. 
       2) The number in parentheses is the t-statistic for the coefficient. 
       3) The coefficients for ISIC 33 were estimated from an 11-country sample (France excluded); 12 countries      
were available for the remaining industries. 
       4)  !, #, and * indicate significance at p=0.01, p=0.05. and p=0.10 with a one-tail test. 
       5) See Table 3 for industry definitions. 
         6) TGap is the logarithm of the technology gap, which is defined as a productivity gap of country ifrom a  
      base country b , the country with the highest TFP, s.t    
  = = t i TFPGap TGap
t i , ln
, where TFPGap is the country’s productivity as a proportion of the 
frontier country’s productivity.       
7) EF is the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom.   18
      The  one unit difference in economic freedom ratings for the Anglo-American countries 
relative to the Social-Market countries, other things equal, would be associated with a 
productivity growth rate 0.02 percentage points higher. 
This remarkably large effect of economic freedom on TFP growth requires further analysis. The 
overall performance of the model appears reasonable. The coefficient on the technology gap 
variable is significant in 9 of the 10 preferred specifications, suggesting productivity 
convergence.  
  Although it is important to examine the effect of simply adding the economic freedom 
index to the convergence equation, the mechanism through which economic freedom induces 
productivity growth can be modeled more usefully by considering a specification with an 
interaction term. Following Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), among others, we first substitute the 
growth rate of the frontier for the time dummies in equation 6. By this mechanism, the influence 
of the growth rate of the frontier may be transmitted directly to the follower countries. Greater 
economic freedom may directly influence the productivity growth rate by providing stronger 
incentives for innovation.  It may also increase the rate at which a follower country absorbs 
technology because of more flexible markets as well as greater incentives. We investigate the 
effect of freedom on technology transfer by interacting the technology gap with economic 
freedom. Adding Frontier Growth and the interaction term to equation (6), we get,  
  = D + ) 1 ( ln t to t i TFP t it it owth FrontierGr EF TFPGap ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + 3 2 1 ln b b b a  
    i i i it it Country EF TFPGap e b b + ￿ + * ￿ + ln 4         (7) 
This model differs in two ways from the previous model. First, the frontier growth rate enters 
explicitly. Second, the effects of freedom and the technology gap are no longer linear. The catch-
up coefficient is now b1 + (b4  EF) and the economic freedom coefficient is b2 + (b4 lnTFPGap). 
We expect the coefficients of lnTFPGap and economic freedom, b1 and b2, to be negative and 
positive. b1 is the catch-up coefficient, assuming that the economic freedom index is zero, which 
eliminates the interaction term. b2, on the other hand, is the economic freedom coefficient for the 
frontier country.  (For the frontier country, the TFP gap is one; its logarithm is zero, which 
eliminates the interaction term. For all other countries, the logarithm of the TFP gap is negative.) 
We expect economic freedom to be positively associated with the growth of the productivity 
frontier. In addition, we expect the coefficient of frontier growth to be positive and that of the 
interactive term to be negative. A negative coefficient for the interaction term means that the   19
catch-up coefficient, b1 + (b4  EF), is larger in absolute value, the greater the value of the freedom 
index. Convergence accelerates. A negative coefficient for the interaction term also means that 
the effect of freedom, (b2 +  b4 lnTFPGap) on productivity growth will be greater the farther the 
country is from the frontier. A negative interaction term means that freedom makes it easier to 
catch up and that the importance of freedom in catch up is greater the farther the country is from 
the frontier.  
  Columns 2-5 in Table 5, give the estimates of equation 7 with country dummies included. 
The F statistic for dropping the country dummies is in column 7. It fails to meet the critical value 
of 2.11 (p=0.05) for the manufacturing sector and for four of the branches.  For these five 
industries, we next test the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the technology gap and 
economic freedom are jointly equal to zero. This null could not be rejected for three branches, 
34, 35, and 384. Again the preferred estimates are in bold type. 
  The results for the manufacturing sector require additional consideration, particularly 
because the test for the joint significance of the country fixed effects at p=0.05 is right on the 
margin.  The equation without the country fixed effects in columns 8 -11 has insignificant 
coefficients of economic freedom and frontier growth. The coefficient of the technology gap is 
positive and statistically significant. This result says that if the economic freedom index is zero, 
TFP grows faster the smaller the technology gap. In this case the effect the technology gap on 
growth is the catch-up coefficient times TGap. TGap is the logarithm of the productivity ratio, 
resulting in its logarithm being zero or negative. As the gap increases—the productivity ratio 
gets smaller—the variable takes increasingly large negative values, resulting in larger reductions 
in growth. Recall, however, that this is for an economic freedom index of zero; because no 
country in the sample has a zero freedom index, the effect of economic freedom on the catch-up 
coefficient must be considered. 
  The observed range for the economic freedom index, however, is roughly from 5 to 8. To 
find where the catch-up coefficient switches from divergence to convergence, set b1+ (b4 ￿ EF), 
equal to zero and solve for EF. The coefficient equals zero when EF = b1/ b4. Using the restricted 
results for the manufacturing sector, this is 5.  So the catch-up coefficient is positive with 
freedom indices less than 5, in which case productivity diverges.  Divergence is greater, the 
greater the technology gap. Convergence occurs for countries with freedom levels greater than 5. 
For these countries, convergence is faster the greater the technology gap. The size of the catch-
up coefficient varies with the level of economic freedom; for freedom indices of 7 and 8, the   20
catch-up coefficients are (0.20 – (-0.04 * 7) -0.08 and –0.12. Thus, the greater the freedom index, 
the faster the convergence. 
  The restricted estimate shows that economic freedom has a positive effect on TFP growth 
even though the coefficient of EF is not significantly different from zero.  The freedom 
coefficient is –0.04 times TGap. For the frontier country, freedom has no effect on growth. For 
productivity ratios of 0.75 and 0.50, the associated TGaps are –0.29 and –0.69, giving freedom 
coefficients of 0.0116 (given by (-0.04*-0.29)) and 0.0276. 
  The unrestricted estimate for the manufacturing gives a similar result for the catch-up 
coefficient; the breakeven freedom index is 5.8. If it is less than 5.8, growth rates diverge; greater, 
they converge. As the freedom index goes from 7 to 8, for instance the catch-up coefficient goes 
from –0.11 to –0.20. The economic freedom coefficient in this estimate, however, is somewhat 
different; it is  -0.02  – 0.09 TGap.  Thus, for the frontier country (TGap is zero) economic 
freedom reduces productivity  growth. The coefficient remains negative until the productivity 
ratio falls to 0.8. The farther the country from the frontier, the greater the freedom coefficient. 
For productivity ratios of 0.75 and 0.50, the freedom coefficients are 0.006 and 0.042. 
The coefficient for the technology gap is positive and significant, as we have seen for the 
manufacturing sector, for five of the industries (ISIC 32, ISIC 33, ISIC 34, ISIC36 and ISIC38).  
To interpret this, it is necessary to consider the coefficient in conjunction with the interaction 
coefficient. So, for industry 32, the effect of the gap on productivity growth is 1.11 – 0.17 * EF. 
If EF is 6.5, which is the lowest value for the index in 1996, the coefficient for catch up is 0.005. 
There would be no convergence. A freedom index of 8 yields a catch up coefficient of -0.25. 
Dividing the gap coefficient by the interaction coefficient gives the economic freedom value for 
which the coefficient is zero. For industries 32 and 33 the coefficients imply that the least free 
countries in the sample are not converging.  For the remaining industries with both of these 
coefficients significant, the breakeven value of economic freedom is 5 or less, which implies that 
all of the countries in the sample have a catch-up coefficient that leads to convergence. It is 
important to note, also, that in all cases the greater the freedom index, the faster the convergence. 
For the three industries where the gap coefficient is omitted from the equation, catch up occurs 
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Table 5. The Direct and Indirect effects of theTechnology Gap and Economic Freedom on TFP Growth 
in the Manufacturing Sector and Selected Industries: The Interaction Model 
 
  1      2  3  4  5  6  7  8     9     10            11       12 
        Full Model        Preferred Model if Full Model is rejected  
Industry TGap     EF  Front  TGap￿EF  R
2  F-Stat   TGap  EF  Front  TGap￿EF  R
2  
  ISIC 3  0.52
!  -0.02
!  -0.58  -0.09
!  0.70  2.10      0.20
!  0.00  -0.41  -0.04
!  0.48 
    (4.44)  (-2.73)  (-1.57)  (-5.33)      (2.35)  (-0.74)  (-1.02)  (-3.13)               
                                                                                               
  ISIC31  0.05  -0.02  0.17  -0.02
*  0.59  2.26                 
    (0.56)  (-1.40)  (0.61)  (-1.65)                           
                                                                                               
  ISIC32  1.11
!  -0.08
!  -0.84  -0.17
!  0.71  3.63                 
    (5.45)  (-3.36)  (-0.56)  (-6.20)                           
                                                                                               




!  0.72  2.76                 
    (5.15)  (-1.72)  (1.53)  (-4.86)                           
                                                                                               
  ISIC34  0.30  -0.01  -0.05  -0.06  0.59  1.86          -0.23  -0.01
!  0.30 
    (1.81)  (-1.00)  (-0.22)  (-2.46)          (-1.04)  (-3.90)          
                             
  ISIC35  -0.46  0.01  0.56  0.04  0.50  1.84          0.29
#  -0.01
!  0.17 
    (-1.45)  (0.76)  (3.69)  (0.82)          (2.13)  (-2.78)       
                                                                                               
  ISIC36  0.27
#  0.01  0.16  -0.07
!  0.70  3.12                 
    (2.10)  (1.07)  (0.35)  (-3.91)                           
                                   
  ISIC37  0.13  -0.01  0.76
!  -0.04
!  0.70  2.45                 
    (1.27)  (-0.69)  (2.52)  (-3.02)                           
                                                                                               
  ISIC38  0.38  0.01  0.15  -0.07  0.60  1.47      0.25
#  0.00  0.39
*  -0.05
!  0.29 
    (2.24)  (0.47)  (0.40)  (-3.02)      (2.02)  (-0.39)  (1.45)  (-2.64)       
                                                                                               
  ISIC384 0.00  0.02  0.58  -0.02  0.53  1.09          0.34
!  -0.01
!       
    (0.02)  (1.39)  (3.64)  (-1.07)           (2.36)  (-3.97)       
Note:        1) Bold type indicates the preferred model. 
       2) The number in parentheses is the t-statistic for the coefficient. 
       3) The coefficients for ISIC 33 were estimated from an 11-country sample (France excluded); 12 countries      
were available for the remaining industries. 
       4)  !, #, and * indicate significance at p=0.01, p=0.05. and p=0.10 with a one-tail test. 
       5) See Table 3 for industry definitions. 
          6) TGap is the logarithm of the technology gap, which is defined as a productivity gap of country ifrom a  
      base country b , the country with the highest TFP, s.t    
  = = t i TFPGap TGap
t i , ln
, where TFPGap is the country’s productivity as a proportion of the 
frontier country’s productivity.       
7)   EF is the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom.  
8) Front is Frontier Growth, which is the growth rate of TFP for the leading country.  
9) TGap.EF is TGap times EF. 
   22
  The coefficient of economic freedom is only significant in two of the preferred 
specifications—for industries 32 and 33—and it takes a negative value. Taken literally, as we 
have seen, this says that for the frontier—the technology gap is zero—economic freedom reduces 
productivity growth. At the average value of the technology gap for these two industries, 
productivity growth is positively associated with economic freedom. But as the gap narrows, 
eventually the partial effect of freedom on growth is negative. This result is fairly robust for 
industries 32 and 33, and it is difficult to find an explanation. For the remainder of the industries, 
except for 35 where it is not significant, the partial effect of freedom on growth is given by the 
interaction coefficient times the level of the technology gap. The greater the gap, the greater the 
growth. Perhaps the most significant conclusion from this analysis is that freedom has its effect 
on productivity growth indirectly through it effect on the size of the catch-up coefficient and 
through an additional effect that is stronger the farther the country is from the frontier.  
  Finally, the effect of growth in the productivity frontier, which we expect to positive, is 
significantly greater than zero in five of the industries. It is significant at 0.01 in one industry, 
0.05 in two industries, and 0.10 in two industries. 
  This section shows a reasonably strong association between economic freedom and 
productivity growth. Adding the level of economic freedom to a traditional convergence 
equation, we find that convergence is generally supported. If time effects are omitted, we also 
find that economic freedom is positively associated with productivity growth. Using F tests, we 
find that time effects are not significantly different from zero. The preferred model is the one 
without country and time effects for seven of ten industries. The manufacturing sector and five of 
the nine disaggregated industries have significant freedom coefficients in the preferred models. 
Expanding the model to include the interaction between economic freedom and the technology 
gap provides even stronger support for the role of economic freedom in productivity growth. 
This interaction term is significant in all industries.  Its negative coefficient implies that as 
economic freedom increases, convergence is enhanced. It also implies that as the technology gap 
widens economic freedom has a greater effect on productivity growth. In two or three instances, 
economic freedom has a negative effect on productivity growth for countries at or close to the 
frontier. For these same industries, countries productivity diverges for countries at the lowest 
observed freedom levels. 
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Conclusion 
 
  This chapter examines productivity convergence and economic freedom for 12 selected 
OECD countries, 8 of which are in the EU.  These countries experienced rising levels of 
economic freedom beginning in 1975. Other EU countries and current and potential accession 
countries have also experienced increased levels of economic freedom. 
Three Anglo countries and four Social-Market countries have experienced these increases, but 
the Anglo countries have freedom levels above the Social-Market o nes.  Productivity 
convergence among EU countries is of particular interest because it would ease certain problems 
associated with deeper integration. We do not have data for current accession countries, but we 
do for eight EU countries, including three that joined in the 1980s, and four non-EU countries. 
The observed convergence among these countries suggests that the current accession countries 
may be experiencing convergence. 
  We find an association between variations in economic freedom and productivity growth that 
is counter to Freeman’s findings. We believe that our results differ from his because we test for 
time fixed effects and find that they are often jointly insignificant. We also find that economic 
freedom and the technology interact, such that economic freedom is more important the farther a 
country is from the frontier and that convergence is faster the greater the level of economic 
freedom. If the current accession countries follow the pattern of the earlier accession countries, it 
can be expected that economic freedom will be increasing in those countries. Our results indicate 
that increases in economic freedom, in turn, will enhance productivity convergence and 
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